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property described in this pleading adverse
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title thereto,
Defendants.

Appellate Case No. 20081050
(Trial Court No. 030922233)

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

APPEAL FROM ORDER ENTERED DECEMBER 4, 2008
BY THE HONORABLE LEON A. DEVER
THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY
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Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Attorneys for Defendants
Cynthia M. Lloyd and
Dennis S. Lloyd

Billie Crocker
Crocker Law Office, PC
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Salt Lake City, UT 84117
Attorney for Plaintiff, Maurine J.
Lloyd and for Susan L. and
Richard Martinez
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Richard D. Martinez*
*Counsel for the Plaintiff, Billie Crocker, also represents these parties for the purposes of
supporting the Appellee’s position in this appeal
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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Annotated
§78A-4-103(2)(j).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case involves a Stipulation and Agreement for Court Supervised Sale of Real
Property (the “Stipulation”) that provided for the sale of certain real property (the
“Subject Property”). Although the Subject Property was listed indefinitely with Ralph
Reidel of Coldwell Banker (see Addendum A, Exclusive Listing Agreement) and the
Subject Property was under contract for sale (see Addendum B, Real Estate Purchase
Contract), the defendants consistently interfered with the marketing and sale of the
Subject Property resulting in the cancellation of the REPC and Mr. Reidel’s withdrawal
as the listing agent.
Counsel for the defendants was unavailable from October 2007 to April 2008.
R. 435-437 and R. 733. As soon as Russell Cline appeared as counsel for the defendants,

requests were made for the defendants to cooperate actively with the marketing and sale
of the Subject Property in accordance with Paragraph 3 of the Stipulation and Agreement
for Court Supervised Sale of Real Property. Information regarding Equity Real Estate
and the plaintiff’s proposed listing agent was supplied to the defendants and although the
defendant now object to using this real estate company, they never made any attempt to
suggest another realtor. The defendants refused to actively market the Subject Property
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in violation of the Stipulation. Pursuant to Paragraphs 3, 5 and 7 of said Stipulation, the
plaintiff requested that the trial court extend the sale period. On August 26, 2008 this
request was granted although no particular real estate company was named in that Order.
R. 588-589. The defendants were provided with a listing packet for Equity Real Estate
and did not propose another realtor for the listing.

Counsel for the defendants

consistently led the Equity Real Estate realtor, Dovey Roah, to believe that his clients
would be signing a listing agreement with her (See Addendum C, email of 9/23/2008
from Dovey Roah, regarding her impression that Mr. Cline and his clients were agreeable
to the listing.
The defendants filed an Objection to the Form of the August 26, 2008 Order on
August 28, 2008 which was heard on October 28, 2008. At this time the trial court was
again persuaded that the sale period for Subject Property should be extended and
specifically ordered that the sale period could not begin until all parties had signed a
listing agreement with Equity Real Estate. The minimum sale price agreed to in the
Stipulation and Agreement for Court Supervised Sale of Real Property was not altered
and the trial court merely reiterated Paragraph 5 of the Stipulation and Agreement for
Court Supervised Sale of Real Property by making it clear that if the parties could not
agree on offers or if any party continued to act as an impediment to the sale, offers would
be presented to the trial court for review.
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1. Was the trial court authorized under the terms of the Stipulation to order an
extension of the sale period when presented with evidence that the Subject
Property had previously been under contract, that the defendants had interfered
with the initial six month sale period, that another realtor was interested in
listing the Subject Property and that the summer would present an optimum
opportunity to attract new offers for a sale?
2. Did the trial court have the power to replace the real estate listing agent when
the agent hired by the parties withdrew his services and the parties could not
agree on a replacement?
3. Did the Stipulation expire by the lapse of time even though a valid Listing
Agreement actively marketing the Subject Property was not in place?
4. Is the plaintiff entitled to attorney’s fees on this appeal?
ISSUES PRESERVED IN TRIAL COURT
The plaintiff agrees that the foregoing issues were preserved in the trial court at
both the May 19, 2008 and October 28, 2008 hearings.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under the terms of the Stipulation (Paragraph 5 and 7), the trial court had
authority to extend the sales period if it was “persuaded” that such an extension would
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likely result in the sale of the Subject Property and to order that offers to purchase be
presented to the court for consideration if the parties cannot agree upon acceptance. R.
402. Enforcement of the Stipulation is reviewed for abuse of discretion and the trial court
should not be reversed unless its decision exceeds the limits of reasonability Brighton
Corp. v. Ward, 31 p.3d 594 (Ut App. 2001).
As to the issue of whether or not the trial court acted properly in appointing a new
realtor, it is not clear that this decision should be reviewed under the standard suggested
by the defendants. While legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness, findings of fact
are given deferential review and appellate review is strictly limited.

Grayson v.

Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989) and Craig v. Weihing, 746 P.2d 279, 282, 283
(Utah 1987). Here the Stipulation is ambiguous with respect to the rights and duties of
the parties if the realtor selected by them resigns. Accordingly, the trial court made
findings of fact and concluded that the intent of the stipulation could not be completed
without the appointment of a new realtor. This decision was consistent with the intent of
the Stipulation (to sell the Subject Property) and should not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous. The appellate courts do not lightly disturb such findings. Saunders v. Sharp,
806 P.2d 198, 200 (Utah 1991).
Even if the appointment of another realtor is reviewed for abuse of discretion, this
Court has held that enforcing a settlement agreement and even setting deadlines for
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completion of improvements (where none previously existed in the settlement) was not
an abuse of discretion. Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938, 945 (Utah 1987).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. The Plaintiff, Maureen J. Lloyd, did NOT quit-claim any property to the
Defendants on September 30, 1997 – she believes the transfer was fraudulent. Indeed,
the purpose of this lawsuit is to invalidate the alleged conveyance and quiet title to the
property to the plaintiff.
2. While it is true that the parties’ entered into a Stipulation and Agreement for
Court Supervised Sale of Real Property on June 12, 2007, the defendants have
misrepresented the provisions of the Stipulation and its practical application to other local
laws and regulations, for example, it is a violation of the code of ethics for a realtor to
actively market a property without first obtaining a Listing Agreement signed by all
parties. Therefore, the Subject Property could not be listed or marketed for sale until all
parties executed a Listing Agreement with a licensed real estate agent.
3. Counsel for the defendants was unavailable from October 2007 to April 2008.
R. 435-437 and R. 733. The defendants have consistently refused to sign any such

Agreement thus sabotaging the Stipulation and any potential marketing or sale of the
Property in direct violation of Paragraph 3 of said Stipulation which requires all parties to
“actively market in good faith the Subject Property”. R. 401.
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4. On May 19, 2008 the plaintiff made a motion pursuant to Paragraph 7 of the
Stipulation to extend the sale period for the Subject Property. Susan L. Martinez and
Richard Martinez, parties to the Stipulation, were aware of this hearing date and agreed
with the plaintiff’s motion to extend. The defendants fail to include in their statement of
facts the plaintiff’s motion to extend the sale period included a proffer that the original
listing agent, Ralph Reidel, had withdrawn as the listing agent due to the defendants’
failure to cooperate with the first listing and Real Estate Purchase Contract.

The

defendants have never disputed the allegation that they have failed to cooperate with the
marketing of the Subject Property. The plaintiff also proffered that the marketing and
sale period should be extended as the property had previously been under contract and
that with summer approaching this would be the best time of year to list the Subject
Property for sale and get it back under contract. R 726-727.

Pursuant to Paragraghs 5

and 7 of the Stipulation, Judge Dever was persuaded by these facts that an additional six
month sale period would likely result in the sale of the Subject Property and on August 5,
2008 he ordered an extension of the sale period. This Order was signed on August 26,
2008 and did not alter the listing price or the ultimate sale price.
5. Although not made part of the record, the defendants were given a listing
packet prepared by Dovey Roah, Equity Real Estate and dated April 23, 2008. Until
now, the defendants have never objected to hiring Dovey Roah, Equity Real Estate, as the
listing agent. In fact, conversations with the defendants’ counsel on or about September
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23, 2008 led Ms. Roah to believe that the Petitioners were in agreement to list the
property with her firm. See Addendum C email dated September 23, 2008.
6. The defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss on August 18, 2008 (in violation of
Paragraph 2 of the Stipulation) and an Objection to the Proposed Order on August 28,
2008. The Objection was heard on October 28, 2008. At that hearing, the defendants’
failure to cooperate and the requirement that the parties sign a listing agreement was
discussed. R. 726-729, 736, 738

The defendants were specifically ordered to execute

the listing agreement as a prerequisite to beginning the additional sale period. The
defendants did not obey this order and have still not signed a listing agreement nor have
they made any attempts to cooperate with the marketing or sale of the Subject Property.
7. The defendants’ Statement of Facts would lead this Court to believe that the
contemplated sale MUST be for no less than $9.50 per square foot. This is not true as
Paragraph 5 of the Agreement clearly states that the parties will “list and market” the
Subject Property for sale for no less than $9.50 per square foot. This Paragraph 5
alsogives the trial court discretion to entertain all offers and to order the sale of the
Property if the parties cannot agree or if either party fails to cooperate in the sale. R. 401.
The listing agreement proposed by Equity Real Estate was that the Subject Property be
marketed for $10.00 per square foot. (Addendum D, page 2) This is in compliance with
the terms of the Stipulation.
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8. The defendants have inaccurately quoted the Stipulation and have inserted the
requirement that the Property sell for “not less than $9.50 per square/foot [sic]” when
Paragraph 7 of the Stipulation authorizing the District Court to extend the sales period
contains no such restriction.

Furthermore, although the minutes of the hearing on

October 28, 2008 state that “the price of the home may change”, the lower court did not
order a reduction in the list price. See Minute Entry of 10/28/08 and the December 4,
2008 Order. R. 645 and R. 649-651. No reduction in the asking price has ever been
ordered by the trial court.
9. Despite the trial court’s explicit Orders (in August 2008 and again in December
2008) to immediately list the property, the defendants have delayed signing the listing
agreement and have brought motions and petitions designed to avoid marketing the
Subject Property. The realtor has attempted to obtain signatures for the Listing
Agreement by contacting the defendants’ attorney and by trying to contact the defendants
directly. The defendants have impeded the marketing of the Subject Property for the last
ten months in violation of Paragraph 3 of the Stipulation (to actively market in good
faith) and Paragraph 8 of the Agreement to Sell Real Property dated 6-12-2007 (to
cooperate fully and promptly with each other and the Listing Agent). R. 395-434.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court was persuaded that an extension of the sale period would likely
result in a sale of the Subject Property and correctly granted the requested extension as
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authorized by the Stipulation (Paragraph 7). Likewise, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by reminding the parties in its order of December 4, 2008 that the court was
authorized by Paragraph 5 of the Stipulation to review offers to purchase if the parties
could not agree upon acceptance. The trial court’s decision to enforce the terms of the
Stipulation should not be reversed unless it was an abuse of discretion. Mascaro v.
Davis, 741 P.2d 938, 942 (Utah 1987).
The defendants have inaccurately marshaled the evidence and claim that there are
no facts supporting the trial court’s decision. The trial court considered the following: 1)
that the Subject Property had previously been under contract 2) that the contract for
purchase had failed and that the listing agent had withdrawn his services, 3) that the
defendants were not cooperating with the listing or sale of the Subject Property, 4) that
opportunities for a sale of the Subject Property still existed and 5) that the summer
market was approaching and would be a good time to get the Subject Property back on
the market. In light of these facts, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it
reasonably concluded that an additional six month sale period would likely result in the
sale of the Subject Property.
The court did not err in appointing a listing agent since the realtor chosen by the
parties had withdrawn, the parties could not agree on a replacement, and the appointment
was required in order to accomplish the stated goals of the Stipulation. Courts possess
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inherent powers to make decisions that ensure the pursuit of a just process and result.
Burke v. Lewis, 122 P.3d 533, 538 (Utah 2005).
The Stipulation has not expired because the Subject Property could not be
“actively marketed” as required by the Stipulation unless a Listing Agreement was signed
by all parties and in full force and effect. The defendants admit that the realtor resigned,
that counsel was unavailable and that they would not sign a new Listing Agreement.
Therefore, the extended sale period has never started.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY
ENFORCING THE TERMS OF THE STIPULATION AND EXTENDING
THE SALE PERIOD

The law favors settlement of disputes and enforcement of settlements between the
parties litigant should be encouraged. Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938, 942, 946-947
(Utah 1987). In this matter, the Stipulation clearly provides that “the sale period may be
extended for an additional six (6) months, by Court order, provided that the Court is
persuaded that an additional six (6) month sale period will likely result in the sale of the
Subject Property”. R. 403. This provision says nothing about list price or sale price
although the defendants have consistently inserted an additional requirement in Paragraph
7 that the extension would likely result in the sale of the Subject Property “for not less
than $9.50 per square foot”. See Appellant’s Brief at pages 4 and 6, 10, 14. If the
defendants wanted Paragraph 7 to read exactly this way, then they should have written
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the document as they now read it as they were the drafters. The clear language of the
Stipulation, however, only requires that the Court be persuaded that that an extension
would likely result in a sale.
In extending the sale period, the trial court considered the following: 1) that the
Subject Property had previously been under contract 2) that the contract for purchase had
failed and that the listing agent had withdrawn his services, 3) that the defendants were
not cooperating with the listing or sale of the Subject Property, 4) that the defendants
were not represented by counsel for an extended period of time, 5) that opportunities for a
sale of the Subject Property still existed and 6) that the summer market was approaching
and would be a good time to get the Subject Property back on the market. Factual
findings serving as a predicate for the trial court’s actions will be disturbed only if they
are clearly erroneous. Grayson v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989) In light of
these facts, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it reasonably concluded that
an additional six month sale period would likely result in the sale of the Subject Property.
In addition to the facts noted above, the trial court was also presented with
information that a new realtor was willing to list the property. The defendants claim that
the Listing Packet prepared by Equity Real Estate is a fact that should not be considered
as the Packet is not reflected in the record. The Packet clearly exists and was presented
to the defendants. See Addendum D.

This Court in Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938,

943 (Utah 1987). held that when crucial matters are not in the record, the missing
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portions are presumed to support the trial judge.

Therefore, the existence and

information contained in the Listing Packet is presumed to be additional evidence
available to the trial judge in support of his decision.
Courts have the power to summarily enforce settlement agreements and it would
have been an abuse of discretion for the trial court not to have extended the sale period as
there appears to be no reason for the defendants’ noncompliance. See In Re Adoption of
E.H., 103 P.3d 177, 185 (Utah App. 2004). The defendants interfered with the first sale,
were uncooperative with the listing agent, their counsel was unavailable for months and
they failed to execute a second listing agreement.
Considering all evidence presented by the plaintiff and the non-existence of any
evidence that the Subject Property would not sell, the trial court’s decision to extend the
sale period was predicated on an overwhelming amount of facts any of which could have
persuaded the court that an extension was reasonable and likely to result in a sale. The
extension was authorized by the Stipulation (Paragraph 7) and should not be overturned.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT IS AUTHORIZED BY THE STIPULATION TO
REVIEW OFFERS TO PURCHASE IF THE PARTIES CANNOT AGREE
AGREE UPON ACCEPTANCE
The defendants claim that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering that

“Offers to purchase shall be presented to the court for consideration if the parties cannot
agree upon acceptance”. This Order is authorized by Paragraph 5 of the Stipulation
which provides for judicial review of proffered offers if any party “fails, refuses to
12

cooperate, fails to perform in accordance with the terms of the Agreement to Sell Real
Property or otherwise acts as an impediment to the sale of the Subject Property”. In light
of the defendants’ failures to cooperate and obvious avoidance of the new realtor, Judge
Dever was merely anticipating resolution of future disagreements between the parties by
reminding the parties that the court had the power to review and order a sale if the parties
did not cooperate when offers were received.
The defendants also claim that the Order eliminated the requirement that the
property be marketed for no less than $9.50 per square foot. This is not true. The Order
made no decision to summarily accept any offer presented regardless of price and the
Listing Agreement proposed suggests that the property be marketed for $10.00 per square
foot, an amount exceeding the minimum required by the Stipulation. The defendants’
argument that the Order somehow affected the list price or the ultimate selling price has
no merit.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT HAS INHERENT AUTHORITY TO APPOINT A NEW
REALTOR WERE THE STIPULATION IS AMBIGUOUS AND THE APPOINTMENT
IS NEEDED TO ENSURE THE PURSUIT OF A JUST PROCESS AND RESULT

Courts of general jurisdiction have the inherent power to make and enforce all
necessary rules and orders calculated to enforce the orderly conduct of their business and
secure justices between parties litigant. Peterson v. Evans, 55 Utah 505, 188 P. 152, 153
(Utah 1920). Courts possess inherent powers to ensure the pursuit of a just process and
result. Burke Lewis, 122 P.3d 533, 538 (Utah 2005).
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In this case, the Stipulation is ambiguous with respect to the rights and duties of
the parties if the realtor selected by them withdraws. In such an instance it is proper for
the trial court to take evidence necessary to establish the terms of the agreement and
appellate review is “strictly limited”. Craig v. Weihing, 746 P.2d 279, 282, 283 (Utah
1987). The appellate courts do not lightly disturb such findings. Saunders v. Sharp, 806
P.2d 198, 200 (Utah 1991). The trial court considered the facts (R. 725, 726, 737-739)
and appointed a new realtor in order to accomplish the goals of the Stipulation. A “just
process and result” could not be ensured and the intent of the stipulation could not be
completed without appointment of a new realtor. This is consistent with the intent of the
parties and local industry standards and state regulations that require a property marketed
for sale to be formally listed for sale with a licensed realtor.
IV.

THE STIPULATION HAS NOT EXPIRED AS THE SECOND SALE
PERIOD HAS YET TO BEGIN
The trial court rejected the defendants argument that the mere passage of time

exceeding two consecutive six month periods was enough to satisfy the marketing
periods contemplated by the Stipulation. The trial court specifically noted that it made no
sense to count this time against the plaintiff when the defendants were actively filing
motions and refusing to list the property. R. 734-735.
At the time that the listing agent, Ralph Reidel, withdrew his representation, the
defendants’ counsel had filed a Notice of Unavailability and their current counsel admits
that he did not appear until April 2008. R. 435-437 and R. 733. The motion to extend
14

the sale was made in May 2008. The plaintiffs were certainly not responsible for any
delay in marketing and should not lose the opportunity to extend the sale period as clearly
authorized by Paragraph 7 of their Stipulation.
The trial court considered these facts and reasonably concluded that the goals of
the Stipulation to “actively market” the Subject Property (See Paragraph 3 of the
Stipulation, R. 401) could not be accomplished unless the property was properly listed
and marketed for sale by a licensed realtor. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by
ruling that the extended sale period could not begin until a valid Listing Agreement is
signed.
V.

THE PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF HER ATTORNEYS
FEES INCURRED IN THIS APPEAL
Paragraph 11, Section E of the Stipulation (R. 404) provides that the prevailing

party is entitled to recover attorneys’ fees, court costs and other expenses on appeal in the
event of any controversy relating to or arising from the Stipulation. In the event that the
appellee is the prevailing party on appeal, this Court should award appellees her
attorneys’ fees incurred on appeal.
CONCLUSION
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in extending the sale period as it was
presented with sufficient information to persuade the court that an extension would likely
result in the sale of the Property. Judge Dever’s Order of December 4, 2008 did not alter
the terms of the Stipulation, affect the rights of the parties or materially affect the final
15

decision of the case as the Order merely served to implement the terms of the parties’
Stipulation and made no other decisions regarding sale of the Property. The Order does
not alter the listing price but merely restates Paragraph 5 of the Stipulation which
provides for judicial review of proffered offers if an offer is presented and the parties
cannot agree upon its acceptance. Nowhere in the Order is the sale price or listing price
reduced.

In light of the Petitioners failure to cooperate, Judge Dever was merely

anticipating resolution of future disagreements between the parties by clarifying the
Stipulation and the need to execute a listing agreement in order to begin the extended sale
period. There has been no abuse of discretion and the trial court’s enforcement of the
Stipulation and extension of the sale period should be upheld.
The Order of December 4, 2008 simply clarifies the Stipulation and makes it clear
to the parties that the Property cannot be considered to have been actively marketed until
all parties sign a listing agreement. It makes no sense to argue that the sale period has
already elapsed simply because time has passed because the Property cannot be actively
marketed for sale without a valid Listing Agreement executed by all parties and property
owners. In the first sale period, the Petitioners selected the listing agent and all parties
signed the listing agreement clearly starting a sale period. The listing ended when the
realtor withdrew his continued representation because he found the Petitioners to be
uncooperative and not truly interested in selling the Property. The parties failed to agree
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upon a new listing agent or upon an extension of the sale period thereby prompting the
plaintiff’s motions.
The court did not err in appointing a listing agent as it had inherent powers to
make rulings needed to ensure a just process and result. The Stipulation is ambiguous
with respect to the rights and duties of the parties if the realtor selected by them
withdraws. Accordingly the trial court was justified in taking evidence to establish the
terms of the agreement and to appoint a new realtor in order to accomplish the goals of
the Stipulation.
The interests of justice will be better served if the Stipulation is enforced and the
Property actively marketed in an attempt to avoid the expense of additional litigation.
The trial court’s Order should be upheld.

DATED THIS _____ DAY of April, 2009.

BY:
____
Billie Crocker, Attorney for Plaintiff, Maureen
J. Lloyd, Susan L. Martinez and Richard
Martinez
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
A copy of the foregoing Appellee’s Brief was mailed on the ___th day of April, 2009,
postage prepaid to the following:
Russell A. Cline
10 West 100 South, Suite 425
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
_________________________________
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